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ABSTRACT
Prior experimental and empirical research documents that many investors have a lower propensity
to sell those stocks on which they have a capital loss. This behavioral phenomenon, known as ￿the
disposition effect,￿ has implications for equilibrium prices. We investigate the temporal pattern of stock
prices in an equilibrium that aggregates the demand functions of both rational and disposition investors.
The disposition effect creates a spread between a stock￿s fundamental value -- the stock price that would
exist in the absence of a disposition effect -- and its market price. Even when a stock￿s fundamental value
follows a random walk, and thus is unpredictable, its equilibrium price will tend to underreact to
information. Spread convergence, arising from the random evolution of fundamental values, generates
predictable equilibrium prices. This convergence implies that stocks with large past price runups and
stocks on which most investors experienced capital gains have higher expected returns that those that
have experienced large declines and capital losses. The profitability of a momentum strategy, which
makes use of this spread, depends on the path of past stock prices. Crosssectional empirical tests of the
model find that stocks with large aggregate unrealized capital gains tend to have higher expected returns
than stocks with large aggregate unrealized capital losses and that this capital gains ￿overhang￿ appears
to be the key variable that generates the profitability of a momentum strategy. When this capital gains
variable is used as a regressor along with past returns and volume to predict future returns, the momentum
effect disappears.
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Email: bhan@anderson.ucla.eduMomentum, which is the persistence in the returns of stocks over horizons between three
months and one year, remains one of the most puzzling anomalies in ﬁnance. Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), for example, found that past winning stocks, as measured by returns over
the prior six months tended to subsequently outperform past losing stocks by about twelve
percent per year. Various explanations for momentum have been advanced, but few have
stood up to rigorous empirical tests or calibration. Moreover, most of these explanations are
more rooted in attempts to explain momentum than in developing a general theory of how
demand for stocks aﬀects equilibrium pricing.
While momentum-motivated theories have been categorized as belonging to the ﬁeld
of behavioral ﬁnance, there is a seemingly unrelated branch of the literature in behavioral
ﬁnance that documents stylized facts about investor behavior. It is motivated by experiments
on individual investors and observations of their behavior in real ﬁnancial markets. It rarely
attempts to link its stylized facts about investor behavior to equilibrium prices. Perhaps the
most well-documented behavioral regularity in this literature is what Shefrin and Statman
(1985) termed “the disposition eﬀect.” This is the tendency of investors to hold onto their
losing stocks to a greater extent than they hold onto their winners.1
This paper analyzes how aggregate demand and equilibrium prices evolve over time when
they are aﬀected by the existence of a ﬁxed proportion of investors who exhibit the dispo-
sition eﬀect. It is possible to analytically prove that if some investors are subject to the
disposition eﬀect, then stocks with aggregate unrealized capital gains tend to outperform
stocks with aggregate unrealized capital losses. This paper shows, both theoretically and
empirically, that the disposition eﬀect may account for the tendency of past winning stocks
to subsequently outperform past losing stocks.
The intuition for our model is rather simple. Assume for the moment that some investors,
the disposition investors, perturb otherwise rational demand functions for a stock they own
because they have experienced unrealized capital gains or losses in the stock. Such investors
would tend to have higher demand for losing stocks than for winning stocks, other things
equal. If demand for that same stock by other investors is not perfectly elastic, then such
demand perturbation, induced by a disposition eﬀect, tends to generate price underreaction
to public information. Stocks that have been privy to good news in the past would have excess
1The disposition eﬀect is sometimes linked to, but is really distinct from loss aversion.L o s s a v e r s i o n
occurs when two conditions are met: (i) the decline in utility for a loss (measured relative to a reference
point) exceeds the increase in utility for an equal sized gain (relative to the same reference point); (ii) a
gamble that is always a loss relative to the reference point generates higher utility than a certain loss with the
same mean while the reverse preference applies to gambles that are always gains. In a market with a single
risky asset, one can see how an investor might be more likely to substitute a risk-free asset for a risky asset
in a gain situation (where utility is locally concave) than a loss situation (where utility is locally convex).
However, in a multiasset multiperiod framework, it is necessary to argue that reference prices change to
induce substitution of one risky asset with a paper gain or loss for another. This complex setting is atypical
in the modeling of loss aversion. Moreover, once we allow for such reference price changes, there is little
need for the remaining utility assumptions of loss aversion.
1selling pressure relative to stocks that have been privy to adverse information. This produces
a spread between the fundamental value of the stock — its equilibrium price in the absence
of any disposition eﬀect among investors — and the market price of the stock. Aggregate
investor demand equals supply in the model when the stock price is a weighted average of its
fundamental value and a reference price (related to the basis at which disposition investors
acquired the stock).
The demand perturbation and associated spread does not, per se, generate momentum
in stock returns. For momentum to arise, there must be some mechanism that forces market
prices to revert to fundamental values. As one example of the importance of this reversion,
note that if all investors are identical and subject to the disposition eﬀect, market prices
deviate from fundamental values. However, in the absence of trading, it would be reasonable
to conclude that the reference price (such as the cost basis) of disposition investors would
not change. In this case, the associated demand perturbation generates a market price that
is a constant weighted average of the stock’s fundamental value and a ﬁxed reference price.
Because the weights are constant, changes in market prices are just dampened versions of
changes in fundamental values. Hence, if fundamental values follow a random walk, so do
market prices, despite their underreaction to information about fundamentals.
One could imagine various forces that drive market prices to their fundamental values,
thus generating momentum. A press release about an acquisition, an earnings announcement,
and a reduction in uncertainty all are events that may make some investors rely less on
their behavioral tendency to sell winners and hold onto losers. However, it is surprising to
discover that a random process for a stock’s fundamental value, in and of itself, makes a
stock’s reference price, and hence its market price, catch up with its associated fundamental
value. In other words, trading, which arises in the model only because some investors exhibit
the disposition eﬀect, produces mean reversion in the spread between a stock’s fundamental
value and its market price. By deﬁnition, the stochastic process for a stock’s market price is
the stochastic processes for its fundamental value less that for its spread; hence, any mean
reversion in the stochastic process for the spread implies that stocks with positive spreads
have risk-adjusted mean returns that exceed the risk-free return, while those with negative
spreads have risk-adjusted mean returns that are below the risk-free return. The mean return
of a stock that is a big winner, which tends to have a positive spread between its fundamental
value and market price, thus tends to exceed that of a loser, which tends to have a negative
spread.
The diﬀerence between the market price and the reference price is proportional to the
spread between the fundamental value and the market price. Thus, it, too, is of the same
sign as the expected return. If the reference price is related to some aggregate cost basis
in the market, as the motivation for this paper suggests, this diﬀerence is a gain measured
relative to a reference price that is the cost basis.
The empirical implications of the model, outlined above, are veriﬁed with cross-sectional
2“Fama-MacBeth” regressions that make use of a “capital gains overhang” regressor to proxy
for aggregate unrealized capital gains or losses. In all of our regression speciﬁcations, the
gain variable predicts future returns, even after controlling for the eﬀe c to fp a s tr e t u r n s ,
but the reverse is rarely true. Indeed, in most of our regression speciﬁcations, there is no
momentum eﬀect once the disposition eﬀect is controlled for with the gain regressor.
Section I of the paper presents results derived from a model with two types of investors:
O n et y p eh a sn od i s p o s i t i o ne ﬀect and is fully rational; the other is identical to the ﬁrst type
except that the disposition eﬀect perturbs his demand function for stocks. These include
results about the temporal pattern of equilibrium prices conditional on both aggregate capital
gains and past returns. It also includes resultsa b o u tt h ed e t e r m i n a n t so ft r a d e sa n dv o l u m e .
Section II presents empirical data and provides numerous tests illustrating that our ﬁndings
are not due to omitted variables that others have used in the literature to analyze momentum.
Our main ﬁnding here is that the capital gains overhang is a critical variable in any study of
the relation between past returns and future returns, as the theory would predict. Section III
discusses the relation of our work to prior literature, both theoretical and empirical. Section
IV concludes the paper.
I. The Model
In an attempt to make the model as simple and analytically tractable as possible, we
focus on how the partial demand function of a single risky stock among possibly many assets
has its equilibrium price path aﬀected by the disposition eﬀect
• The risky stock that we focus on is in ﬁxed supply normalized to one unit. Public news
about the fundamental value of the stock arrives at discrete dates t =0 ,1,2,...just
prior to trading on those dates
• There are two types of investors:
— The fraction 1 − µ are type-r “rational” investors
— The fraction µ are type-d “disposition” investors




t =1 + bt(Ft − Pt)( 1 )
D
d
t =1 + bt[(Ft − Pt)+λ(Rt − Pt)] (2)
where
3— bt is a positive parameter that represents the slope of the rational component of
the demand functions for the stock.2 This parameter is actually a function that
can be contingent on just about anything in the date t information set of investors,
including Pt, Ft, Rt, λ, µ, historical values of these variables, or corresponding
information for other assets.3
— λ is a positive constant parameter measuring the relative importance of the dis-
position component of demand for type-d investors
— Pt is the price of the stock
— Rt is a reference price representing a weighted average of the past prices at which
type-d investors executed trades, and
— Ft is the stock’s rational equilibrium price, or fundamental value4
For λ > 0, one of the two investor-types is relatively more averse to realizing losses.
When this investor-type has a paper capital loss, he holds more shares than his rational
counterpart. It would be wrong to model him as focused only on stocks that have declined
in value since their purchase. Disposition investors are not characterized by a propensity to
accumulate more stock than rational behavior would suggest. Rather, the experimental and
empirical evidence only indicates that their propensity to sell stocks they have lost money
on is less than their propensity to sell stocks they have made money on. Hence, the other
side of the coin of loss aversion is a relatively greater propensity to sell stocks experiencing
a gain. As our demand function suggests, when good news about the fundamental of the
stock arrives after the loss averse investor has bought it, he experiences a paper gain, and
sells more of the stock than he would if he were fully rational and the stock was trading at
t h es a m ep r i c e .
The experimental and empirical evidence focuses on active buying and selling behavior.
Modeling equilibrium requires that buying and selling behavior be endogenously derived
from demand functions. For an investor to have a greater propensity to sell a stock with
a paper gain, the excess demand of that investor must be lower for such a stock than it
2To isolate the impact of the disposition eﬀect, and avoid possible confounding eﬀects arising, for example,
from diﬀerences in risk aversion across investor-types, we assume that all investor-types have the same slope
to the rational component of their demand functions, bt.
3We can think of bt as being whatever solves for the optimal demand function given a utility function.
4For our results, it is not necessary to be precise about how one arrives at this fundamental value. We
would merely like the fundamental value to converge to the equilibrium price as the number of disposition
agents converges to zero. Two speciﬁc alternatives come to mind. In the ﬁrst, the fundamental value at
date t is the market price that would prevail at date t if all agents were fully rational but behaved under the
assumption that, in the future there would be disposition agents and equilibria as speciﬁed in the model. In
t h es e c o n d ,t h ed a t et fundamental value is the price that would prevail if all agents were fully rational and
assumes that, in the future, all agents continue to be fully rational. In the appendix, we employ the former
alternative to analytically compute fundamental values and market prices for a multiperiod exponential
model. This interpretation of F makes the fundamental value a function of λ.
4would be in the absence of disposition behavior (as described above). For an investor to
have a lower propensity to sell a stock with a paper loss, the excess demand of that investor
must be higher for that stock. One can quibble about what the experimental and empirical
evidence on buying and selling behavior has on the functional form of the demand function.
We have no interest in debating this issue, as there is little evidence about what the true
demand functions of such investors look like.5 In the interest of parsimony and tractability,
equation (2) simply assumes a functional form for the deviation from rational behavior where
the deviation parameter λ is constant.6
Note that if λ is zero, (or, alternatively, if µ = 0), so that all investors are “rational,”





t =1+bt(Ft − Pt)
and thus, with bt  = 0, supply equals demand when Ft = Pt. In this sense, the fundamental
value F is simply the price that would prevail in the absence of a disposition eﬀect. The
fundamental value is thus the present value of the free cash ﬂow stream of the stock con-
ditional on all information currently available, adjusted for the risk premium.7 One of the
main goals of this paper is to assess how the disposition eﬀect alters the stochastic process for
equilibrium prices. As a benchmark, and consistent with an extensive literature in ﬁnance,
we assume that the fundamental value follows a random walk:
Ft+1 = Ft +  t+1 (3)
where the  s are i.i.d. and mean zero.8
5Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), however, estimate that large positive (negative) price deviations from
the cost basis generate more (fewer) sales.
6In the interest of lucidity, we see no point to artiﬁcially complicating the model with utility functions.
The solution to rational investor demand may aﬀect the fundamental value; beyond this, however, it is not
present in the equation that determines the equilibrium price.
7The precise structure of dividends, free cash ﬂows, or information is not important for our purpose. For
example, we can assume the stock pays a dividend each period or only one liquidating dividend at some far
away future date.
8As we demonstrate in a subsequent footnote, the absence of a random walk for fundamental values
does not alter any of our results if we interpret all expectations in the paper as risk-neutral expectations.
Alternatively, if a random walk does not apply to fundamental values, our results are simply measuring
the incremental stochastic processes arising from disposition agents. That is, we are providing closed form
solutions for how the stochastic process for equilibrium prices deviates from the stochastic process that
would prevail in the absence of disposition agents. However, our desire to ignore the confounding eﬀects
of changing risk premia arising from in an equilibrium generated by an intertemporal representative agent
model has precedent: We are unaware of any nontrivial models of this class where the equilibrium stochastic
process for prices has been derived analytically. A trivial model that achieves this rare feat is provided in
the appendix.
5A. Equilibrium
When λ = 0, both investor types are rational and hold 1 − µ and µ shares, respectively.
Thus, there is no trading. However, when λ is nonzero, the demand of the type-d investors
is also aﬀected by the unrealized capital gain as measured relative to their reference price.
This provides the key motive for trade between the two types of investors. Thus, at each
date t, aggregate demand equals aggregate supply when
1+bt(Ft − Pt)+µλbt(Rt − Pt)=1 ( 4 )






computed at the equilibrium prices for dates t and t − 1. Volume and turnover ratio are
identical here since there is one share outstanding.
The market clearing condition, equation (4), is equivalent to




demonstrating that the equilibrium market price is a weighted average of the fundamental
value and the reference price. Since 0 <w<1, the market price underreacts to public infor-
mation about the fundamental value, holding the reference price constant. (Market prices
also underreact for reference prices that follow equilibrium paths, as we will see shortly.) The
degree of underreaction, measured by w, depends on the proportion of disposition investors,
µ,a n dt h er e l a t i v ei n t e n s i t yo ft h ed e m a n dp erturbation induced by the disposition eﬀect,
λ. The fewer the number of disposition investors, and the smaller the degree to which each
perturbs demand, the closer the market price will be to its fundamental value.
To illustrate how changes in the fundamental value of the stock aﬀect equilibrium prices,
consider a case where type-d investors’ entire holding of shares was purchased at a funda-
mental, market, and reference price of $100 per share last period. Because the three prices
were equal, type-d holdings equal µ shares. Suddenly, bad news arrives and the fundamental
value drops to $80. The equilibrium price must end up between the fundamental value of
$80 and the reference price of $100. At a price at or below $80, the stock is too attractive as
the demand functions of both types of investor ss u g g e s tt h a tt h e yw o u l dw a n tt oh o l dm o r e
than they currently own. Equilibrium prices cannot be those at which aggregate demand
for the stock exceeds one share. Similarly, the equilibrium price cannot be at or above $100
either, since aggregate demand would be below one share and both investor-types would like
to sell stock at such prices.
If the fundamental value of the stock is $80, type-r investors want to sell some of the
stock they own at prices above $80. At some price between $80 and $100, these type-r
6investors exactly accommodate the extra buying pressure from the type-d investors. The
market will be in equilibrium at this price, a weighted average of the fundamental value and
the reference price.9 Since the equilibrium price must lie between $80 and $100 per share, the
downward price response to the news is sluggish, settling at a weighted average of the past
price at which shares were purchased by disposition investors and the fundamental value.
(A similar argument applies for good news that generates a fundamental value above $100.)
In the illustration above, we had some trades at $100 per share (by assumption) at what
we will refer to as date 0 and then another set of trades occurring at some price between $80
and $100 at date 1. Knowing the parameters of the model would have allowed us to solve
for the date 1 equilibrium price as the single unknown of a linear equation. Assume for the
moment that this price turned out to be $85. To solve for the date 2 equilibrium price as
a function of the date 2 fundamental value, it is critical that we know the date 2 reference
price. It seems reasonable to think that this reference price is going to be some weighted
average of $100 and $85. If we know this reference price, solving for the equilibrium price as
a function of the date 2 fundamental value is again trivial.
B. Reference Price Dynamics
The reference price is esta b l i s h e dw h e na ni n v e s t o rﬁrst enters into a position and it is
updated as the investor trades. Our speciﬁcation for its dynamics here, which is consistent
with the existing experimental and empirical evidence, is that the type-d investors’ reference
price satisﬁes the diﬀerence equation
Rt+1 = νtPt +( 1− νt)Rt (6)
where νt, a function of the type-d investors’ date t information, lies between 0 and 1.








ωτ =1 , ωτ > 0, (7)
F o re c o n o m i cc o n t e n t ,s u c ha st i e st oac o s tb a s i s ,i ti su s e f u lt ot h i n ko fνt as linked to the
trading volume of type-d investors. However, our theoretical results are suﬃciently general
as to not require even this restriction. For the theoretical ﬁndings in this section, the interval
restriction for νt should hold in any reasonable speciﬁcation of the reference price dynamics.
For example, the reference price dynamics speciﬁed in equation (6) is not only consistent
with the type-d investors’ cost basis as the reference price; it is also consistent with the
9Clearly, although we do not make use of utility functions, the fact that demand functions are not perfectly
elastic reﬂects some risk aversion, capital constraint, or other force restraining unlimited trade by investors.
10Iteratively expanding equation (6) implies that the weight on date t − τ’s price, ωt−τ =( 1− νt)(1 −
νt−1)···(1 − νt−τ+1)νt−τ. On the other hand, equation (7) is consistent with νt−τ =
ωt−τ
1−ωt−ωt−1−···−ωt−τ+1.
7reference price being a weighted average of past prices with weights proportional to trade
size, to some function of time proximity of trades in the past, or to any combination of the
two.
Empirical analyses, presented later in the paper, requires a more precise speciﬁcation of
νt. As one example, we might assume that each share is as likely to trade as any other and
that the probability of a trade in a share on any one day is independent of when it has traded
in the past. In this case, a proxy for the aggregate cost basis of the outstanding shares is
obtained by setting νt as date t turnover, Vt. The associated expression for ωt−τ,t h ew e i g h t
on date t − τ’s price, is the product of the probabilities that a share did not trade between
dates t−τ +1andt,( 1−Vt−τ+1)···(1−Vt−1) times the probability that it traded on date
t − τ, Vt−τ. The resulting reference price is the expected cost basis of an outstanding share
under the assumptions given above.
Earlier, we argued that market prices, Pt, respond sluggishly to changes in the fundamen-
tal value, ceteris paribus.B e c a u s eνt lies between 0 and 1, the reference price also responds
sluggishly to changes in the fundamental value. We can see this by substituting equation (5)
into (6), obtaining
Rt+1 = wνtFt +( 1− wνt)Rt (8)
This equation also points out that the reference price is always reverting to the fundamental
value.
C. Can the Equilibrium Degenerate?
The previous subsections argued that we cans o l v ef o ra ne q u i l i b r i u mi nc l o s e df o r m
by assuming fully rational behavior on the part of one class of investors. Our closed form
solutions arise from modeling the type-d investor behavior as a speciﬁc perturbation of this
fully rational behavior. Modeling disposition behavior in this form allows us to calculate
closed form equilibrium prices as functions of fully rational prices, the fundamental values.
This appears to be almost too good to be true as the fundamental values cannot be solved
for directly, except in very special cases.11 Moreover, fully rational behavior recognizes that
disposition investors exists. Rest assured that with virtually any reasonable intertemporal
utility function, this does not generate an inﬁnite loop that fails to generate an equilibrium.
The type-r investors, unless they are risk neutral, do not fully undo the impact of the
type-d investors perturbation. As a consequence, the equilibrium does not collapse. To
illustrate this point — that the type-r investors can solve for optimal demand recognizing
the impact of type-r investors who partly mimic them, and that a Walrasian auctioneer
can solve for prices that arise from the speciﬁed demand structure — we derive closed form
solutions for demand and prices in one very special case: In this case, we solve for a date 0
11As noted earlier, closed form solutions for equilibria in intertemporal models have been found only in
trivial cases.
8equilibrium involving type-r agents who maximize the expected negative exponential utility
of date 2 wealth, and trade with type-d agents at dates 0 and 1. We also assume that the
fundamental value at date 2 is normally distributed, and that the information about the date
2 value that arrives at date 1 also is normally distributed. The closed form solutions for the
date 0 and date 1 demand functions of type-r investors, along with the date 0 and date 1
equilibrium price and fundamental value functions, are found in the appendix. This should
be suﬃciently convincing that there is nothing aberrational going on within our model,
despite an underlying complexity that has been deliberately masked.
D. Expected Price Changes
Although the fundamental value, by assumption, follows a random walk, changes in
equilibrium prices are predictable in this model. To see this, note that by equation (5), the
price change can be expressed as:
Pt+1 − Pt = w(Ft+1 − Ft)+( 1− w)(Rt+1 − Rt)( 9 )
and thus the expected price change is
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=( 1− w)(Rt+1 − Rt)( 1 0 )
Subtracting equation (10) from (9) and substituting in (3) implies
Pt+1 − Pt − Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=w t+1
proving that price changes underreact to news about fundamentals. Although this may con-
tradict the suggestion in Shiller (1981) that prices are too volatile relative to fundamentals,
the lower price volatility feature is a necessary feature of any model of price underreaction.
Equation (10) implies that changes in equilibrium prices are predictable. Reference prices
for the date t + 1 equilibrium are known at date t. Moreover, from equation (8),
Rt+1 − Rt = wνt(Ft − Rt)( 1 1 )
which, substituted into equation (10), implies
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=w(1 − w)νt(Ft − Rt)( 1 2 )
Alternatively, this equation is equivalent to
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=wνt(Ft − Pt)( 1 3 )
and to
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=( 1− w)νt(Pt − Rt)( 1 4 )
by the equilibrium pricing condition, equation (5). These ﬁndings are summarized below:
9Proposition 1 If the date t fundamental value exceeds date t’s market price (or reference
price), or if the date t market price exceeds date t’s reference price, then the stock price is
expected to increase next period. Similarly, if the date t fundamental value is exceeded by
date t’s market price (or reference price), or if the date t market price is exceeded by date t’s
reference price, then the stock price is expected to decrease next period. The expected price
change is proportional to the change in the reference price. Moreover, the expected return is
increasing in the diﬀerence between the fundamental value and the market (or the reference)
price, or in the diﬀerence between the market and reference prices, and in the weight placed
on the current market price in updating the reference price.
Hence the date t unrealized gain gt,d e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market and
reference prices,
gt = Pt − Rt (15)
or, alternatively, the date t spread between the fundamental value and the equilibrium price




or the date t gap between the fundamental value and the reference price determine (along
with the weights w and νt) the expected price change from t to t+1. All of these are driven
by the innovation in the fundamental value, which is the model’s only source of uncertainty.
The sign of the date t spread between the fundamental value and the equilibrium price is
the same as the sign of the expected future price change, Et[Pt+1 − Pt], because the former
spread is mean reverting and by deﬁnition,
Pt+1 − Pt =( Ft − Pt) − (Ft+1 − Pt+1)+( Ft+1 − Ft)
which has an expectation of
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=( Ft − Pt) − Et[Ft+1 − Pt+1]( 1 7 )
since the fundamental value follows a random walk. However, with mean reversion in the
spread, the expectation on the right side of equation (17) is smaller in absolute terms than
the term in parentheses it is subtracted from. Hence, if the spread, Ft − Pt, is positive, the
diﬀerence between the spread and the expected spread is positive; if the spread is negative,
the diﬀerence is negative. To understand why this mean reversion exists, we prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The gain gt, which is the diﬀerence between the market and reference prices,
mean reverts towards zero. The rate of mean reversion is greater the larger is the absolute
magnitude of νt, and the smaller is λ and µ. The same result applies to the spread, Ft −Pt,
a n dt ot h eg a p ,Ft − Rt.
10Proof: By equations (3), (11), and (15),
gt+1 − gt = w t+1 − wνtgt (18)
Hence, Et[gt+1 − gt]=−wνtgt. The mean reversion speed is not constant, but is increasing
in νt and w. The spread and gap are constant proportions of the gain so this result also
applies to the spread or gap. q
Proposition 2 states that the reference pricei sa l w a y st r y i n gt oc a t c hu pt ot h el a t e s t
fundamental value (and market price). As trading occurs, the reference price gets updated
with some weighting of the latest market price, which, in turn, is updated by the latest
fundamental value. This implies that the gain, the spread, and the gap tend to narrow over
time. As the next result indicates, these will widen or change sign only as a consequence of
extraordinary innovations in the fundamental value.
Proposition 3 If the date t gain, gt, is positive (negative), it will continue to be positive
(negative) unless a suﬃciently large negative (positive) shock to the fundamental arrives.
Assume that νt is positive. Then, the absolute magnitude of the gain will increase next
period only if a signiﬁcant shock of the same sign as the gain arrives. Otherwise, the absolute
magnitude of the gain will decrease next period. The same results apply to the spread and
the gap.
Proof: All statements follow from equation (18) which states that gt+1 = w t+1+(1−wνt)gt.
Assume gt > 0. Since 0 < νt < 1a n d0<w<1, gt+1 > 0u n l e s s t+1 is suﬃciently negative.
Equation (18) also implies gt+1 − gt < 0i f t+1 < 0o ri f t+1 is positive but not too large.
An analogous result applies to the negative gain. Since the spread st and gap are constant
multiples of the gain gt, the same conclusions necessarily apply to them. q
The results above, applied to the unrealized gain gt, describe expected future price
changes that are conditional on the relation between the market price and the reference
price. This suggests there is an interesting line of empirical work that explores the rela-
tionship between aggregate capital gains and the cross-section of expected returns. It also
may explain why momentum strategies are proﬁtable, as stocks with large positive diﬀer-
ences between the market price and reference pri c et e n dt ob ew i n n i n gs t o c k sa n dv i c ev e r s a .
However, this diﬀerence is path dependent. There are historical price paths for a stock,
when combined with reasonable speciﬁcations for the reference price updating parameter,
νt, that generate negative gains, and hence negative expected returns, even when past prices
have increased. Similar, anomalous paths exist for losing stocks. Thus, while momentum in
stock returns may be an artifact of the disposition eﬀect because past returns are correlated
with variables like aggregate capital gains, our model implies that for a given past return,
some types of paths will generate higher expected returns than others. Lacking a speciﬁc
functional form for νt,i ti sd i ﬃcult to quantify which paths have higher expected future
11returns than others. However, it is fair to say that past returns are merely noisy proxies for
behavioral variables, like capital gains, and are likely to be poorer predictors of expected
returns than capital gains proxies if our model is an accurate portrayal of how demand for
stock is generated.
There is one class of past return paths for which the gain and spread are necessarily of
the same sign as the past return. Stocks that have reached a new high (or low) relative to
a reasonably lengthy historical period are those for which past returns, irrespective of the
past return horizon in the historical period are all positive (or negative). Such “consistent
winning” (or “consistent losing”) stocks necessarily have investors who acquired the stock
at a basis below the current price — thus experiencing a capital gain (or, in the case of the
consistent losers, a capital loss). Given the reference price updating rule, and Proposition 1,
t h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l tm u s th o l d :
Proposition 4 When the market price is at a new high (new low), the gain is positive (neg-
ative) and over the next period, the expected change in the market price is positive (negative).
Although there are occasional historical paths for winning stocks that generate negative
spreads and negative expected future returns, intuition tells us that it is unlikely, particularly
if the past return is large, that these paths could dominate the abundant number of paths
for which the spread is positive (and thus, for example, most investors experience capital
gains). This intuition is indeed correct.
Before demonstrating this formally, it is useful to ﬁrst express the reference price explicitly
as a weighted average of the fundamental valuesa tp r e v i o u sd a t e s .T h i si sd o n eb ya p p l y i n g
equation (11) iteratively.
Rt = wνt−1Ft−1 +( 1− wνt−1)wνt−2Ft−2 + ···+( 1− wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n−1)wνt−nFt−n
+(1 − wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n−1)(1 − wνt−n)Rt−n (19)
This is a complex expression, with coeﬃcients on the Fsa n dRt−n that may be path
dependent. But notice that these nonnegative coeﬃcients sum to one (which is not surprising
given that the reference price is a weighted average of the current price and the prior period’s
reference price and the current price is a weighted average of the current fundamental value
and the current reference price). More recent prices have more inﬂuence on the current
reference price. As we push further back into history (larger n), we can see that what
happens at a remote historic date matters little for the current reference price. In this sense,
the market is slowly forgetful. The larger the νso rw, the faster the market forgets. For this
reason, any insights from this model do not depend on initial conditions, provided that the
security under study is suﬃciently long-lived.
The low weight placed on the distant past is not the only justiﬁcation for our assertion
that initial conditions are unimportant. We can also justify initial conditions with no spread
12as a good approximation because the fundamental value and the market price tend to revisit
each other as time evolves. As the following proposition proves, in continuous time, this
occurs with probability one.
Proposition 5 Assume that F follows a diﬀusion process in continuous time and trading
occurs continuously. Given any date t spread, st, with probability 1, there is a date in the
future when the market price equals the fundamental value (a spread and gain of zero).12
Proof: Suppose the gain gt is negative. Let F ∗ be the all time high of the fundamental value
up until date t. A basic property of Brownian motion is with probability 1, it will eventually
hit any number. Hence with probability 1, there exists a future date τ when Fτ =2 F∗ for
the ﬁrst time. That means F has a new high at τ, and hence by Proposition 4, gτ > 0. Since
the reference price is a weighted average of historical F’s and F has a continuous sample
path, gt will also have continuous sample path. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem,
sometime between t and τ there will be a date when the gain is zero. The proof is the same
when the gain is positive. q
We now derive a closed form solution that quantiﬁes momentum in stock returns. Using
equation (19), the gain gt = Pt − Rt can be written as:
gt = w t + w(1 − wνt−1) t−1 + ···+ w(1 − wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n+1) t−n+1
+w(1 − wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n)(Ft−n − Rt−n)( 2 0 )
This relation turns out to be useful in analyzing how past changes in the fundamental value
aﬀect future expected returns. The next proposition actually provides a closed form solution
for this conditional expectation.
Proposition 6 Given a historical horizon of n periods
E[Pt+1 − Pt|Ft − Ft−n = x]
= w(1 − w)
x
n
E[νt(1 + (1 − wνt−1)+...+( 1− wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n+1)]
+w(1 − w)E[νt(1 − wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n)(Ft−n − Rt−n)] (21)
This conditional expectation is increasing in x, ceteris paribus, and for positive (negative)
x, is positive (negative) if either the absolute magnitude of x or n is suﬃciently large, or
is positive (negative) for any positive (negative) x provided that Ft−n − Rt−n ≥ 0 (≤ 0)o r
negative (positive) but of suﬃciently small absolute magnitude.
Proof: By the law of iterated expectations and equation (12),
E[Pt+1 − Pt|Ft − Ft−n = x]=( 1− w)E[νtgt|Ft − Ft−n = x]
12An analogous result holds as an approximation in discrete time with high frequency trading.
13Since the innovation in F is i.i.d.,




Using this equation, the law of iterated expectations, and equation (20), we obtain
E[νtgt|Ft − Ft−n = x]
=E ( E [ νtgt|Ft − Ft−n = x,νt,νt−1,...,νt−n])




E[νt(1 + (1 − wνt−1)+...+( 1− wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n+1)]
+wE[νt(1 − wνt−1)···(1 − wνt−n)(Ft−n − Rt−n)]
The sign conclusions are obvious given that the wν t e r m sa r eb e t w e e n0a n d1a n db e c a u s e
this implies that the maximum absolute value of the ﬁnal expectation term is |E[Ft−n−Rt−n]|,
which is bounded. q
The expectations in Proposition 6 are thoseo fa ne c o n o m e t r i c i a nw h oh a sap r i o rd i s -
tribution for the initial conditions at date 0. However, we have been overly generous in our
bound on the absolute value of the last term in the proof. For virtually any reasonable set
of date 0 values for the fundamental value and the reference price, the ﬁnal term within the
expectation is likely to be negligibly small. Hence, from the perspective of an investor at any
date between dates 0 and t − n, who is aware of the initial conditions, and the path taken
by the fundamental value, the expected price change between dates t and t + 1 will have
the properties described in Proposition 6. By date t, however, and depending on the initial
conditions, there are occasional, albeit rare paths, for which the gain is negative despite an
increase in the fundamental value between dates t − n and t. For this reason, past changes
in the fundamental value, and to a greater extent past changes in prices, should be noisier
predictors of future price changes than proxies for the unrealized gains.13 We explore this
issue in the empirical section of the paper.
E. A Back of the Envelope Calculation of the Expected Price Change
To assess whether our model generates expected price changes that bear any resemblance
t ot h o s eo b s e r v e db ye m p i r i c i s t s ,w en o wu n d e r t a k eab a c ko ft h ee n v e l o p ec a l c u l a t i o no f
E[Pt+1 − Pt|Ft − Ft−n = x].
13If the econometrician can view the distribution of price changes between two consecutive dates within an
interval over which a price change has occurred as being symmetric with respect to any pair of consecutive
dates, the above proposition goes through in exactly the same form with prices replacing fundamental values.
Indeed, as long as expected price changes between two consecutive dates are of the same sign as the price
change over the surrounding interval, positive past price changes generate positive expected returns in the
period immediately following the interval and vice versa.
14Assume for simplicity that for all τ, ντ = ν. By equations (12) and (20),









Suppose that a trading period corresponds to a month, the fundamental value has increased
by 50% over the last twelve months, and w = .75, as would be the case if 1/3o fas t o c k ’ s
ownership was by type-d investors, each of them had a gain-related disposition eﬀect that
inﬂuenced their demand function half as much as the spread between the fundamental value
and the market price. Then, next month the price is expected to increase by 50
48% or slightly
over 1%.
Of course, despite our best attempts at arguing that this is similar to the size of the
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum eﬀect, we have no way to assess if the 0.75 value
for w is truly reasonable. However, the model does provide other predictions, such as those
about volume in the next subsection.
F. Determinants of Equilibrium Trades and Trading Volume
To obtain an expression for trading volume in the model, substitute the equilibrium
price Pt, as given in equation (5), into the demand equations (1) and (2), and multiply the
respective demands by 1−µ and µ, respectively. This gives the equilibrium aggregate share-
holding of each investor-type as a function of the unrealized gain gt = Pt − Rt. Speciﬁcally,
(1 − µ)D
r
t =1− µ + ctgt; µD
d
t = µ − ctgt
where ct = btλµ(1 − µ) is a positive parameter. It follows that the change in the aggregate
equilibrium shareholdings of each investor-type is proportional to the change in the unrealized





t)=ct(gt+1 − gt)+( ct+1 − ct)gt+1





t)=−ct(gt+1 − gt) − (ct+1 − ct)gt+1 (22)
implying the following result:
Proposition 7 Assume that ct+1 − ct is suﬃciently small. Then type-d investors sell stock
to type-r investors when their unrealized gain increases and buy stock from type-r investors
when their gain decreases.
15To elaborate on this point, assume ct = c and substitute equation (18) into the right





t)=−cw( t+1 − νtgt)
Hence, whether type-d investors buy or sell depends on the sign and the magnitude of the
innovation in the fundamental value,  t+1,i nr e l a t i o nt ot h eh u r d l eνtgt.
• Case 1: gt > 0. Then, at t+1, type-d investors sell (these “winners”) only on suﬃciently
good news. The bigger the gain gt, the better the news must be to induce a sale.
• Case 2: gt < 0. Then, at t+1,type-d investors buy (these “losers”) only on suﬃciently
b a dn e w s .T h em o r en e g a t i v egt is, the worse the news must be to induce additional
purchase.
Trading volume, obtained by taking the absolute value of the prior equation is thus
Vt+1 = cw| t+1 − νtgt| (23)
By substituting equation (9) into (23), we can also express the volume in terms of price















This implies the following:
Proposition 8 Assume that ct+1 − ct is suﬃciently small. Then the volume associated
with an increase in the market price is going to be larger when the reference price exceeds
the market price than when the market price exceeds the reference price. Also, the volume
associated with an decrease in the market price is going to be larger when the market price
exceeds the reference price than when the reference price exceeds the market price.
Stocks that have generally been experiencing price increases are those for which the
market tends to exceed the reference price and vice versa. Proposition 8 suggests that major
reversals of fortune are more likely to beget larger volume than repetitions of past trends.
That is, large price decreases (increases) will be associated with the greatest volume impact
f o rs t o c k st h a th a v ee x p e r i e n c e dm a j o ra n dc o nsistent increases (decreases) in value.
G. Numerical Findings and the Length of the Past Return Horizon for Mo-
mentum
Two types of numerical simulations generated several interesting ﬁndings. These sim-
ulations assume bt is constant over time and that the reference price updating weight is
proportional to turnover.
16In a binomial simulation of the model where each period F either goes up (“+” move)
or down (“−”m o v e )b yaﬁxed amount:
• Fix n>m . Among paths with n “+” moves and m “−” moves, the path with the
highest expected positive price change has all the “−” moves at the beginning, while
Et[Pt+1 − Pt] is small or even negative along paths for which all the “−” moves occur
at the end. One should avoid buying winners from the more distant past that recently
have begun to decline in value in a fairly persistent manner.
When the simulations are based on i.i.d. normal innovations in F:
• Stocks with high current volume and low past volume tend to have larger momentum.
If Ft−Ft−n > 0, then Et[Pt+1−Pt] is strongly positively correlated with Vt, and slightly
negatively correlated with average past volume over [t − n,t]. If Ft − Ft−n < 0, then
Et[Pt+1−Pt] is strongly negatively correlated with Vt and slightly positively correlated
with average past volume over [t − n,t].
• Volume and absolute price change are strongly positively correlated.
• The diﬀerence in 1-month returns of the top decile and bottom decile of past performing
stocks, plotted as a function of past return horizon, has a humped shape. See Figure 1.
This last ﬁnding deserves special mention as one of the great curiosities of momentum
is that it only seems to function at intermediate horizons. Our model does not generate
reversals at short or long horizons, but it does generate less proﬁtf r o mm o m e n t u mw h e nt h e
momentum portfolio is formed using past returns over short or long horizons. The model
suggests that the most proﬁtable horizons generated from the model are those that use
intermediate horizon past returns for portfolio formation. The numerical ﬁnding is diﬃcult
to prove analytically; however, it seems rather intuitive. Over very short horizons, it is
rather diﬃcult for the gain to deviate from zero by a large amount, as fundamentals have
not had much time to move, even among the best and worst performing stocks. While the
volatility of the change in a fundamental value that follows a random walk is proportional
to the square root of the past horizon’s length, one must also consider how horizon aﬀects
the stochastic process for the reference price. The reference price reverts to the fundamental
value. Over short horizons, such reversion cannot have much of an eﬀect. However, over
a long horizon, reversion to the fundamental value is likely to have a tremendous eﬀect.
Indeed, as we learned earlier, the gain will be zero with probability one. Reversion in the
gain to zero only enhances the frequency with which this occurs.
A good analogy is a race between two thoroughbred horses with equal expected speed:
the fundamental value horse and the reference price horse. When we sort on past winners,
we are saying that the fundamental value horse is in the lead. However, both shortly after
17the start of the race, and towards the end of the race, he cannot have a very big lead. Near
the start, (and even assuming that the initial acceleration from the starting gate took place
instantly), the top decile fundamental value horse has not had enough time to get far ahead,
despite the average speed being greatest for this leg of the race. Moreover, throughout the
race, whenever the fundamental value horse gets far ahead, the reference price horse speeds
up. However, the fundamental value horse’s speed is not persistent. Hence, conditional on
him being far ahead in the ﬁrst part of the race, he is likely to slow down. This means that
the point at which the gap between the top decile fundamental value horse and the reference
price horse is likely to be greatest is somewhere in the middle of the race.
II. Empirical Tests
Our empirical work utilizes weekly returns, turnover (weekly trading volume divided
by the number of outstanding shares), and market capitalization data from the MiniCRSP
database. The dataset includes all ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE and AMEX
exchanges. NASDAQ ﬁrms are excluded because of multiple counting of dealer trades. The
sample period, from July 1962 to December 1996, consists of 1799 weeks.
A. Regression Description
We analyze the average slope coeﬃcients of weekly cross-sectional regressions and their












, is the dependent variable. Denote r
j
t−t2:t−t1 as stock j’s cumulative return from
weeks t−t2 to t−t1. The prior cumulative returns over short, intermediate, and long horizons
are used as control regressors for the return eﬀects described in Jegadeesh (1990), Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993), and DeBondt and Thaler (1995). Regressor s
j
t−1, the logarithm of ﬁrm
j’s market capitalization at the end of week t − 1, controls for the return premium eﬀect of
ﬁrm size. We also control for the possible eﬀects of volume, including those described in Lee
and Swaminathan (2000) and Gervais, Kaniel, and Minelgrin (2001), by including ¯ V
j
t−52:t−1,
stock j’s average weekly turnover over the 52 weeks prior to week t as a regressor (and in
later regressions, three interaction terms, computed as the product of the former volume
variable and returns over the three past return horizons). We then study the coeﬃcient on
g
j
t−1, a capital gains related proxy. Formally, we analyze the regression,
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4¯ V + a5s + a6g (24)
and variants of it, where, for brevity, we have dropped j superscripts and t subscripts.









18This equation suggests that s measurable variable that predicts expected returns is the
percentage diﬀerence between the market price and the reference price at the beginning of




Theory says that this key regressor should employ Pt−1 instead of Pt−2. W el a gt h em a r -
ket price by one week to avoid confounding market microstructure eﬀects, such as bid-ask
bounce.14
B. Specifying a Reference Price
Theory allows the reference price to be any weighted average of historical market prices.
In empirical work, we have to specify how the weights used to update the reference prices
are determined. Because our theory was motivated by the disposition eﬀect, we believe
that reference prices should represent the best estimate of a stock’s cost basis to disposition
investors. Since we cannot identify who these disposition investors are, our proxy for the
cost basis of a stock is an estimate of the aggregate cost basis for all outstanding shares.
The date t aggregate basis thus requires us to use price and volume data to estimate the
fraction of shares purchased at date t − n<t ,a tp r i c ePt−n, that are still held by their
original purchasers at date t. Summing the products of these fractions and the prices at the
relevant prior dates generates the aggregate cost basis for the market.
Estimating these fractions requires us to model trading behavior. We model the fraction






If we truncate the reference price estimation process at the price ﬁve years prior to week t,























14Our ﬁndings are strengthened without the lag in the price, but possibly for spurious reasons. For this
reason, we do not report these regressions in a table. Also, we obtain essentially the same results when we
multiply the gain variable by turnover, as speciﬁed above. We opt for the more parsimonious representation,
which omits this factor, because there may be a cross-sectional relation between a ﬁrm’s typical νt and w,
which we cannot estimate.
19This model is equivalent to assuming that all shares are symmetric. That is, irrespective of
its trading history, each outstanding share is equally likely to be sold at any date. It can be
shown that with a constant weekly turnover of V , the average holding period is 1
V weeks or
approximately 2
V years. Assuming a constant weekly turnover of 1%, which is approximately
the mean for entire sample period, this implies an average holding period of 2 years.
As noted earlier in the paper, the logic behind the expression for the reference price in
equation (25) is straightforward if we assume k = 1, as is the case when the sum is inﬁnite
rather than over 260 weeks. The turnover ratios, the V s, are then probabilities and each of
the bracketed factors inside the product symbol represents the probability that a share did
not trade at date t − n + τ; the term in front of the product symbol, Vt−n,r e p r e s e n t st h e
probability that the share traded at date t − n; the term in large parentheses in equation
(25) is the probability that the share’s basis is the price at date t − n; and the sum is the
expected cost basis.
Observe that more recent trading prices have more weight on the reference price, other
things equal. This is because the survival probability for a historical price declines geometri-
cally with the passage of time. Indeed, distant prices negligibly inﬂuence the reference price.
Recognizing that distant market prices have little inﬂuence on the regressor, we truncate
the estimation at ﬁve years and eﬀectively rescale the weights to sum to one by having a
k<1. This allows us to estimate the reference price in a consistent manner across the
sample period. The 5-year cutoﬀ, while arbitrary, allows us to analyze a reasonable portion
of our sample period: July 1967 on. Stocks that lack at least ﬁve years of historical return
and turnover data at a particular week are excluded from the cross-sectional regression for
that week. 15
C. Summary Statistics
Figure 2 plots the weekly time series of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the capital
gains regressor. It indicates that there is wide cross-sectional dispersion in this regressor and
a fair amount of time series variation as well. For most ﬁrms, the time series of this variable
exhibits signiﬁcant comovements with the past returns of the S&P 500. For the 10th, 50th,
and 90th percentile of the regressor, plotted in Figure 1, the correlations between the weekly
time series of the regressor and the past one-year percentage change in the S&P 500 index
are respectively 0.50, 0.60, and 0.62.
Table 1 Panel A reports summary statistics on each of the variables used in the regression
described above. These include time series means and standard deviations of the cross-
sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables, along with time series means
of their 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles.
15We veriﬁed that our regression results remain about the same when return and turnover data over three
or seven prior years are used to calculate the reference price.
20We obtain further insight into what determines the critical capital gains regressor by
regressing it (cross-sectionally) on stock j’s cumulative return and average weekly turnover
for three past periods: very short term (deﬁned as the last four weeks), intermediate horizon
(between one month and one year ago) and long horizon (between one and three years ago).
Size is also included as a control regressor. Panel B of Table I reports that, on average,
about 59% of the cross-sectional variation in the capital gains variable can be explained
by diﬀerences in past returns, past turnover, and ﬁrm size. Earlier, we explained that the
reference price is always trying to catch up to a fundamental value that deviates from the
reference price for large return realizations. Consistent with this, Panel B shows that our
capital gains variable, in both cases, is positively related to past returns and negatively
related to past turnover. Also, consistent with the thoroughbred horse analogy explaining
why intermediate horizons are most important, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of intermediate horizon
turnover on the capital gains variable is much stronger than the eﬀect of turnover from the
other two horizons. Controlling for past returns, a low volume winner has a larger capital
gain, while a high volume loser has a larger capital loss. Finally, the size coeﬃcient in this
regression is signiﬁcantly positive, perhaps reﬂecting that large ﬁrms have grown in the past
at horizons not captured by our past return variables and thus tend to have experienced
larger capital gains.
D. Expected Returns, Past Returns, and the Capital Gains Overhang
Table 2 presents the average coeﬃcients and time-series t-statistics for the regression
described by equation (24) and variations of it that omit certain regressors. Each panel
reports average coeﬃcients and test statistics for all months in the sample, for January
only, for February-November only, and for December only. All panels include the ﬁrm size
regressor. Panel A employs only the three past return regressors. Panel B adds volume as a
fourth regressor. Panel C adds the capital gains overhang as a ﬁfth regressor.
Panels A and B contain no surprises. As can be seen, when the capital gains overhang
variable is excluded from the regression, there is a reversal of returns at both the very short
and long horizons, but continuations in returns over the intermediate horizon. Consistent
with prior research, the long horizon reversal appears to be due to January. Panel B indicates
that there is a volume eﬀect, albeit one that is hard to interpret, but it does not seem to
alter the conclusion about the horizons for proﬁtable momentum and contrarian strategies.
Panel C is rather astounding, however. When the capital gains overhang regressor is
included in the regression, there is no longer an intermediate horizon momentum eﬀect. The
coeﬃcient, a2, is insigniﬁcant , both overall and from February through November. However,
except for January, there is a remarkably strong cross-sectional relation between the capital
gains overhang variable and future returns, with a sign predicted by the model.
21E. Explaining Seasonalities
The seasonalities observed in Table II are consistent with what other researchers have
found.16 They are fairly easy to explain within the context of our theoretical model if we
accept that there is an additional perturbation in demand arising from tax loss selling.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), for example, found that there was no disposition eﬀect
in December, and attributed this to the marginal impact of tax loss selling. If we generalize
the demand function of the disposition investor,
D
d
t =1+bt[(Ft − Pt)+λt(Rt − Pt)] (26)
and assume that λt drifts downward in December for certain, as might be expected because of
tax loss selling (possibly, but not necessarily, becoming negative) and reverts to its normal
positive value sometime in early January, we would ﬁnd that the equilibrium eﬀects of
this seasonal demand perturbation would be consistent with our empirical ﬁndings. The
downward drift in λ in December implies that market prices move closer to fundamental
values. For stocks with capital losses, implying that the fundamental value is below the
market price, convergence towards the fundamental value from the decline in λ represents
an added force that makes the market price decline even further than it would were λ to
remain constant. Similarly, the increase in λ in early January would make the prices of these
same stocks with capital losses deviate again from their fair values, leading to a January
reversal.
To understand this more formally, note that with the generalized disposition demand,
equation (26), the expected price change, formerly in equation (14), generalizes to
Et[Pt+1 − Pt]=
w
(1 − wt)νt +




Hence, if we know that λt+1 is going to be lower than λt,w h i c hm a k e swt+1−wt positive, the
expected return between dates t and t + 1 is going to be larger. The evidence in Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) suggests that over the course of December, λ declines to zero but is
positive during the rest of the year. Viewed from the end of November, this would be like
knowing that wt+1 = 1 and larger than wt, thus generating a larger coeﬃcient on the gain
regressor in December than would be observed in months with wt+1 = wt.V i e w e df r o mt h e
end of December, wt = 1 and larger than wt+1. This makes the expected price change during
January negatively related to the gain regressor.
16For example, momentum strategies that form portfolios from past returns over intermediate horizons
appear to be most eﬀective in December, and there is a strong January reversal in the direction of expected
returns when using past returns over any horizon. See, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Grundy
and Martin (2001) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2001)
22F. Robustness Across Subperiods and Gain Deﬁnitions
To most observers, the ﬁrst and second half of our sample period present diﬀerent por-
traits of the stock market. From July 1967 to March 1982, average returns were low, liquidity
was low, and trading costs including commissions were high. The second half of our sam-
ple period, April 1982 to December 1996 corresponds to a sea change in the stock market.
Beginning in August 1982, average returns and trading volume appeared to explode and
trading costs rapidly declined. These subperiods also demarcate an important turning point
in the strength of the ﬁrm size eﬀect. In the second half of our sample period, size was far
less important as a determinant of return premia. Despite these diﬀerences, if our theory
is part of the core foundation of equilibrium pricing, there should be little diﬀerence in the
coeﬃcient on our capital gains regressor. Panels D and E of Table II conﬁrm this hypothesis.
There is only about a one standard error diﬀerence between the average coeﬃcients on the
capital gains regressor in the two subperiods. In both subperiods, the average coeﬃcient is
highly signiﬁcant.
Although we do not report this formally in a table, the signs and signiﬁcance of the capital
gains overhang regressor are not drastically altered by restricting the sample to various size







are also signiﬁcantly related to the future return and knock out past returns over intermediate
horizons as a signiﬁcant predictor of future returns.
G. Alternative Explanations
Could the strength of the capital gains variable as a predictor of returns be due to some
alternative explanation? Table III investigates this issue with respect to two alternatives.
First, Panels A and B examine whether there is some sort of interaction between a ﬁrm’s
average historical turnover and future returns. For example, the results in Table II Panel
C may have arisen because cross-sectional diﬀerences in liquidity imply that the reference
prices of more liquid stocks place greater weight on more recent prices than the reference
prices of less liquid stocks. By formulating a reference price using the average turnover over
the past year in place of each week’s actual turnover, we assess whether it is only the cross-
sectional diﬀerence in liquidity that is responsible for the predictive power of our original
gain variable, or whether the information about a stock’s capital gain inherent in the time
series of its historical weekly turnover also contributes to the predictive power of our ﬁndings
in Table II.
In Panels A and B of Table III, we compute an alternative week t reference price using
¯ V
j
t , ﬁrm j’s average weekly turnover from weeks t − 52 to t − 1 for all of the 260 V si n
23equation (25). Panel A replicates Panel C of Table II, except that in place of the gain
variable, we compute an alternative gain variable using the alternative reference price. As
Panel A indicates, using a ﬁrm’s average turnover for the reference price computation instead
of the actual weekly turnover generates a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the gain variable. The
results are similar to those of Table II Panel C, in that past returns have no predictive power.
Moreover, the coeﬃcients and t-statistics on the alternative gain variable are similar to those
in Table II Panel C.
Table III Panel B runs a horse race between the two gain variables. It is identical to Table
III Panel A, except that the Table II proxy for ﬁrm j’s capital gain is added as a regressor.
The inclusion of this variable eliminates the signiﬁcance of the alternative gain variable, and
its coeﬃcient is about the same size as that in Table II Panel C. While our original gain
variable is based on an imperfect model of the actual capital gains overhang in the market,
it is probably a more precise estimate of aggregate capital gains than the alternative capital
gains proxy constructed from average historical turnover. The fact that it “knocks out” the
alternative as a predictor of future returns is consistent with more precise estimates of the
aggregate capital gain being better predictors of future returns.
A second concern about the signiﬁcance of our capital gains proxy in Table II is that it
represents some complicated interaction between volume and past returns. For example, Lee
and Swaminathan (2000) suggested that high volume losers should have lower returns than
average volume losers and empirically documented that this was indeed the case. Hence, it
is possible that our ﬁndings in Table II arise from the capital gains overhang variable being
correlated with some interaction between intermediate horizon past returns and volume.
Panels C and D of Table III test this hypothesis by adding three turnover and past return
interaction terms.
Table 3 Panel C analyzes the impact of these regressors in the absence of a capital gains
regressor. Even though two of the three turnover-return coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, the
inclusion of these regressors does not subsume the intermediate horizon momentum eﬀect.
Rather, the volume-return interaction seems to work in part by moderating the strong one-
month return reversal.
Once the capital gains variable is added to the regression, as in Table III Panel D, the
intermediate horizon past return becomes insigniﬁcant, while the capital gains coeﬃcient
is highly signiﬁcant. Comparing Table II Panel C with Table III Panel D, the average
regression coeﬃcient for the capital gains variable and its t-statistic are almost unchanged
in the presence of the three turnover and past return interaction terms.
24III. Relation to Prior Research
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) popularized the notion that strategies of buying stocks
with high returns over the prior three to twelve months and selling stocks with poor returns
over the same past horizon dominates a buy and hold strategy,17 Ever since then, researchers
have attempted to come up with explanations for the phenomenon.
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that the proﬁtability of momentum strategies could be due
to cross-sectional variation in the unconditional expected returns rather than any predictable
time-series variation in stock returns. Yet Jegadeesh and Titman (2000) ﬁnd that the cu-
mulative return in months 13 to 60 after the formation of momentum portfolio is negative,
which is inconsistent with the Conrad and Kaul hypothesis. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)
show the component of momentum proﬁts due to cross-sectional variation in unconditional
expected returns is small. Grundy and Martin’s (2001) evidence also appears to contradict
this hypothesis. They ﬁnd that the risk-adjusted proﬁtability of a total return momentum
strategy is more than 1.3% per month and remarkably large and stable across subperiods,
even after subtracting each stock’s mean return from its return during the investment period.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant component of momentum can be
explained by industry eﬀects. However, this does not mean that individual stock momentum
does not exist. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Grundy and Martin (2001), and Chordia
and Shivakumar (2000) show that a component of individual stock momentum is distinct
from industry momentum. The latter paper also argues that momentum proﬁts are driven
by time varying conditional expected returns that are related to the business cycle.
Another strand of the literature uses behavioral models to explain momentum proﬁts.18
These models can be divided into two camps, depending on whether investor behavior gen-
erates overreaction or underreaction. In the positive feedback trader model of DeLong et al
(1990b), prices initially overreact to news about fundamentals, and continue to overreact for
a period of time. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) present a model where in-
vestors are overconﬁdent. This implies overeaction to private information and underreaction
to public information arrival. The investors also suﬀer from a self-attribution bias. Their
17This ﬁnding appears to be fairly universal and robust to methodological tweaking. Rouwenhorst (1997),
for example, ﬁnds that momentum strategies work in twelve European markets. Chui, Titman, and Wei
(2000) document that with the exception of Japan and Korea, momentum proﬁt sc a nb ee a r n e di nA s i a n
markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (2000) document that momentum proﬁts persisted throughout the 1990s.
In contrast, other well known anomalies such as small ﬁrm eﬀect and book-to-market eﬀect disappeared after
being well-publicized. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Fama and French (1996) ﬁnd that risk adjustment
tends to accentuate momentum proﬁts. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) show that intermediate
horizon return continuation can be partially explained by underreaction to earnings news but that price
momentum is not subsumed by earnings momentum. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that past trading
volume predicts both the magnitude and the persistence of future price momentum.
18Hirshleifer (2001) gives a comprehensive account of psychological biases and empirical evidence on the
importance of investor psychology for security prices.
25behavior generates delayed overreaction to the information which is eventually reversed.
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argue that the representative heuristic19 may lead
investors to extrapolate current earnings growth well into the future. At the same time,
investors’ conservativism bias leads to underreaction to new public information. In Hong
and Stein (2000), agents can use only part of the information about the economy because
of communication frictions. In their model, private information diﬀuses slowly through the
population of investors, which causes underreaction in the short run. Momentum traders
can proﬁt by trend-chasing, but cause overreaction at long horizons in doing so.
Our explanation of the proﬁtability of momentum strategies is distinct from explanations
in prior research. Our investors have no cognitive biases such as those based on overcon-
ﬁdence, self attribution, conservativism, or representativeness. There is no mistaken belief
about the fundamental value. There is no time variation in risk, risk aversion, or investor
sentiment driving our results. There are no hidden factors such as those based on indus-
try. Information is symmetric. In asymmetric information models, trading volume reﬂects
investors’ disagreements about a stock’s intrinsic value, and often requires the existence of
noise traders to generate trading volume. There is no information asymmetry in our model,
and no noise traders, but there is volume. Trading occurs because some investors are sub-
ject to the disposition eﬀect. Past trading volume aﬀects the equilibrium price through its
inﬂuence on the reference price, while most extant models have a representative agent and
volume plays no role.
Most importantly, our model is based on well-documented investor behavior and princi-
ples of psychology. Disposition behavior, while inconsistent with the standard neoclassical
framework, has been justiﬁed as a consequence of theories of behavior including prospect
theory,20 regret theory,21 and cognitive dissonance theory.22 Camerer and Weber (1998) and
Heilmann, Lager and Oehler (2000) found evidence for disposition behavior in experimental
markets. Evidence of disposition behavior among actual investors is found in Odean (1998),
Heath, Huddart and Lang (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Locke and Mann
(1999). Odean (1998) analyzes accounts at a large brokerage house and found that there
was a greater tendency to sell stocks with paper capital gains than those with paper losses.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ﬁnd a similar eﬀect among all types of investors in Finland,
even after controlling for a variety of variables that may determine trading. They also ob-
serve that the disposition behavior interacts with past returns in a multiplicative fashion
and has a pronounced seasonality: it disappears in December. Using data from a major
Israeli brokerage house during 1994, Shapira and Venezia show that both professional and
independent investors exhibit the disposition eﬀect, although the eﬀect is stronger for inde-
pendent investors. Heath, Huddart and Lang (1998) uncover disposition behavior relative to
19See Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
20See Shefrin and Statman’s (1985) interpretation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
21See Shefrin and Statman (1985)
22See Shefrin and Statman (1985), Camerer and Weber (1998).
26a reference price of a prior high for the stock price by studying the option exercise behavior
of over 50,000 employees at seven corporations. Locke and Mann (1999) present evidence for
the existence of a disposition eﬀect within a sample of professional futures traders. In their
study, traders held losing trades longer than winning trades and average position sizes for
losing trades were larger than for winners. Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) argue that a
disposition eﬀect has to exist by studying the relationship between volume at a given point
in time with historical volume at diﬀerential prices, controlling for seasonal eﬀects to isolate
tax motivated trading. The disposition eﬀect also inﬂuences agents in the IPO and housing
markets.23
There are a set of papers that are linked to modeling how loss aversion aﬀects equilib-
rium prices and portfolio holdings. 24 Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) model investor
preferences to reﬂect a combination of loss aversion and the “house money” eﬀect of Thaler
and Johnson (1990). Their goal is to show how changing risk aversion explains the high
mean, high volatility, and signiﬁcant predictability of stock returns. They have a representa-
tive agent and no trading, but ﬁnd that the variation in risk aversion of their representative
agent allows returns to be much more volatile than the underlying dividends. Moreover, asset
return predictability found in their model is consistent with the proﬁtability of contrarian
strategies. Our model, by contrast, is consistent with contrarian strategies being money
losers and our investors limited willingness to take positions is consistent with risk aversion.
Trading arises only because of the disposition eﬀect and plays an important role in generating
momentum. Although both the house money eﬀect and the disposition eﬀect can be rooted
in prospect theory, the fact that they lead to such opposite results suggests that they are
truly distinct phenomena. Barberis and Huang (2001) extend this paper to multiple assets in
order to address cross-sectional expected return patterns, such as the value premium. Ang,
Berkaert, and Liu (2001) study portfolio choice under the disappointment aversion prefer-
ence, where outcomes below the certainty equivalent are weighted more heavily than above
the certainty equivalent. They study optimal “non-participation” in the stock market and
cross-sectional variation in portfolio holdings, and they contrast their preference structure
with loss aversion, which, for many parameter values leads to troublesome portfolio predic-
tions. Both Gomes (2000) and Berkelaar and Kouwenberg (2000) study optimal portfolio
choice under loss aversion. Both papers ﬁnd that demand under loss aversion shares some
common features with the disposition eﬀect, pointing to the possibility that loss aversion
can be consistent with the disposition eﬀect.
23See Case and Shiller (1988), Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Kaustia (2001).
24In empirical work, Coval and Shumway (2001) document Chicago Board of Trade proprietary futures
traders are highly loss averse, as they assume signiﬁcantly more afternoon risk following morning losses than
following morning gains.
27IV. Conclusion
Our paper has developed a model of equilibrium asset prices based on the disposition
eﬀect. By restricting loss realization aversion to be a geometric deviation from fully rational
behavior, we are able to generate closed form solutions and a set of powerful propositions
about conditional expected future returns without solving the optimal dynamic portfolio
problem of rational agents. The solution to the portfolio problem drops out of the equations
we are interested in, which focus on deviations from the rational norm. We then test the
model and surprisingly show that the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum eﬀect largely
disappears. This suggests that it is the correlation between past returns and variables related
to the disposition eﬀect that may be driving momentum in stock returns.
In the model presented here, the critical variable determining the sign and magnitude of
a stock’s expected return is the diﬀerence between the stock’s market price and its reference
price. Despite having fully rational investors in the model, they cannot eliminate the impact
of the gain on equilibrium prices. Although, on average, the gain shrinks, the payoﬀ to more
rational investors is uncertain. Hence, rational investors cannot ascertain when reference
prices, and hence market prices, will converge to fundamental values.
DeLong et al (1990b) show that when there are positive feedback traders in the economy,
rational arbitrageurs who anticipate their impact on demand can front-run the other investors
and destabilize prices. Speciﬁcally, when the rational investor receives good news today,
he buys more shares to drive up the price. This, in turn, attracts the positive feedback
investors who buy tomorrow so that the rational investor can exit with a proﬁt. In our
model, there is no way to anticipate the disposition demand in advance, as it is determined
by the future realization of the fundamental value, which follows a random walk and hence
is unpredictable. Any degree of risk aversion on the part of rational agents thus prevents
the model from collapsing.
Our model falls in the class of “underreaction models.” However, it also points out some
interesting implications of underreaction and suggests that our ﬁeld may have to better
clarify what we mean by the term. For example, Barberis et al. (1998) and Shleifer (2000)
deﬁne underreaction as occurring when the average return on the stock following good news
is higher than the average return following bad news. Our model clearly has underreaction,
but the ﬁt with this deﬁnition is imperfect because path dependency generates cases where
this deﬁnition does not hold.25 Our model points to the diﬃculty of measuring underreaction
25The future expected return in our model is of the same sign as the current gain. If the gain is negative
now, it will continue to be negative even after good news is announced, assuming that the news is not good
enough. Hence the expected return is negative following good news following paths with capital losses. On
the other hand, if the current gain is positive, it may still be positive and hence the expected return is
positive, even if the news is bad (but not too bad). Hence, because the path associated with the good news
had a capital loss and the path associated with the bad news had a capital gain, the expected return after
good news was lower than the expected return following bad news. While this is generally not the case, it
28(or overreaction) in terms of subsequent price changes without being able to measure the
degree of underreaction (or overreaction) existing in the market at all times used for these
computations. Similarly, special cases of our model have underreaction at all times, but no
tendency for prices to converge to fundamental values. In these cases, there is not even the
positive autocorrelation that is typically associated with underreaction.
Our assumptions are quite general, allowing the model’s analysis of a partial equilib-
rium for a single asset to be consistent with more comprehensive modeling of a multi-asset
equilibrium. The process by which the market arrives at a fair value in an intertemporal
multi-asset economy can be quite complicated, but that is not our concern. We simply want
to understand as clearly and analytically as possible how a perturbation of investors’ demand
for a single stock, due to the disposition eﬀect, generates deviations from the fully rational
equilibrium. Our “partial” equilibrium approach should not generate conclusions that diﬀer
from those obtained by postulating utility functions and solving for demand functions over
multiple assets that optimize utility unless momentum strategies are true arbitrages that lack
risk. However, prior empirical evidence indicates that momentum strategies are quite risky.
Moreover, we have found that the capital gains overhang of individual stocks is strongly
correlated with the cumulative past return of a broad market index like S&P 500. Thus the
disposition components of demand across stocks are also likely to be positively correlated,
making the disposition eﬀect a systematic risk to potential arbitrageurs. In short, we believe
that our approach, despite lacking a closed form solution for demand functions, does not
generate aberrational conclusions.
Similarly, using what eﬀectively are two representative agents is an oversimpliﬁcation.
However, such a simpliﬁcation is reasonable if aggregate demand generates eﬀective aggregate
reference prices that are weighted averages of current prices and past aggregate reference
prices. While this aggregation cannot be done analytically, we have been quite general in
allowing weights for reference prices to time vary and be path dependent. With this level
of generality in reference price construction, we would be surprised if the two representative
agent paradigm used here does not hold up to closer scrutiny.
The generality of the reference price updating rule in the paper’s theoretical section is
both a strength and a weakness. Any attempt at deﬁning an aggregate reference price for
empirical work requires a concrete updating weight, with little guidance from our theory.
Real-world equilibria, with multiple investors, requires aggregation of investors’ demand and
reference prices. Our speciﬁcation of the aggregate reference price for empirical work is
not the only solution to this problem. While we have analyzed modest variations in the
reference price updating rule and found nothing to refute our conclusions, the exploration of
appropriate and alternative reference price rules is certainly an interesting avenue for future
research.
points to the need for more precision in any deﬁnition of underreaction.
29Table I
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of weekly data on NYSE and AMEX securities from July 1967 to
December 1996, obtained from mini-CRSP. Panel A provides time series averages of the cross-sectional
mean, median, standard deviation, and 10th, 50th, and9 0 t hp e r c e n t i l e so fe a c ho ft h ev a r i a b l e su s e di nt h e
regression
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V ++ a5s + a6g
where r is the week t return, r−t1:−t2 is the cumulative return from week t − t1 through t − t2; ¯ V is the
average weekly turnover ratio over the prior 52 weeks, the ratio of the week’s share volume to the number
of outstanding shares; s is log(market capitalization) measured at the beginning of week t; g is the capital
gains regressor, computed as one less the ratio of the end of week t − 1 reference price to the end of week













with k a constant that makes the weights on past prices sum to one. Panel B presents more detailed
data on the association between the capital gains regressor and other variables. It contains the time-series
average of the coeﬃcients and their associated time series t-statistics for 1539 weekly Fama-MacBeth type
cross-sectional regressions of the form
g = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4V−4:−1 + a5V−52:−5 + a6V−156:−53 + a7s
where V−t1:−t2 is the average weekly turnover from t − t1 through t − t2. R2
adj is the average of the weekly
cross-sectional regression R2s adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Panel A: Time series average of summary statics of the regressors in the regression
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6g
r−4:−1 r−52:−5 r−156:−53 ¯ Vsg
Mean 0.0119 0.1493 0.3487 0.0092 18.7207 0.0560
Median 0.0045 0.0940 0.2098 0.0072 18.7251 0.1062
Std 0.1073 0.4192 0.7585 0.0079 1.9441 0.2508
10 percentile -0.0959 -0.2538 -0.3227 0.0025 16.1399 -0.2810
90 percentile 0.1223 0.5816 1.1097 0.0181 21.2322 0.3122
P a n e lB :A v e r a g ec o e ﬃcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the regression
g = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4V−4:−1 + a5V−52:−5 + a6V−156:−53 + a7s
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 R2
adj
0.5527 0.4907 0.1771 -0.9159 -6.4051 -2.7843 0.0504 0.5879
(73.0290) (51.7965) (37.5209) (-7.6351) (-45.0322) (-27.8215) (55.9642)
30Table II
Cross-sectional Regression Estimates
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions run each week on NYSE
and Amex securities from July 1967 to December 1996. The weekly cross-sectional regressions include all
stocks that have at least ﬁve years of historical trading data on mini-CRSP. The cross section of stock returns
in week t,d e n o t e dr, are regressed on a constant and some or all of the following variables: r−t1:−t2 =t h e
cumulative return from week t−t1 through t−t2, computed over three past return horizons; ¯ V = the average
weekly turnover ratio over the prior 52 weeks, with turnover being the ratio of the week’s share volume to
the number of outstanding shares; s = log(market capitalization) measured at the beginning of week t;a n d
g = the capital gains regressor, computed as one less the ratio of the end of week t−1 reference price to the














with k a constant that makes the weights on past prices sum to one. R2
adj is the average of the weekly
cross-sectional regression R2s adjusted for degrees of freedom. There are a total of 1539 weekly regressions.
The parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are obtained from the time series of the
corresponding cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients. We report the results of regressions over all months,
for January only, February through November only, and December only. Panel A omits the capital gains
and turnover variables. Panel B omits the capital gains variable. Panel C contains the full set of regressors.
Panels D and E report results for the full set of regressors over the ﬁrst and second half of the sample
period.
Panel A
rt = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4s
Period a1 a2 a3 a4
All -0.0482 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0004
(-35.6415) (2.9527) (-3.0054) (-4.2733)
Jan -0.0700 -0.0087 -0.0068 -0.0040
(-9.6647) (-4.5972) (-6.6744) (-10.9146)
Feb-Nov -0.0459 0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-34.0613) (4.3344) (-0.6243) (-1.4488)
Dec -0.0491 0.0051 0.0015 0.0008
(-9.9440) (3.8921) (2.8930) (3.0164)
Panel B
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
All -0.0488 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0540 -0.0004
(-37.2470) (3.5703) (-2.6700) (-2.5732) (-4.4200)
Jan -0.0706 -0.0086 -0.0069 0.0681 -0.0042
(-9.7366) (-4.5561) (-6.5561) (0.9793) (-11.2309)
Feb-Nov -0.0465 0.0021 -0.0000 -0.0729 -0.0001
(-36.0594) (5.1324) (-0.1979) (-3.1591) (-1.5202)
Dec -0.0489 0.0049 0.0015 0.0088 0.0009
(-10.2429) (3.7745) (2.8046) (0.1214) (3.1917)
31Panel C
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
All -0.0425 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0188 -0.0004 0.0040
(-35.9364) (-0.6794) (-5.0871) (-0.9364) (-5.2885) (7.7885)
Jan -0.0520 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0620 -0.0026 -0.0117
(-10.9905) (-0.0477) (-3.8964) (-0.9768) (-8.4381) (-4.9519)
Feb-Nov -0.0407 -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0291 -0.0002 0.0050
(-32.6251) (-0.0768) (-3.6950) (-1.3143) (-2.8816) (9.4191)
Dec -0.0498 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.1238 0.0001 0.0104
(-10.8151) (-1.8953) (-1.3410) (1.7980) (0.2702) (6.2673)
Panel D: July 1967 to March 1982
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
All -0.0552 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0143 -0.0007 0.0046
(-31.6943) (-0.9578) (-5.7743) (-0.4054) (-5.2407) (6.1793)
Jan -0.0631 -0.0005 -0.0045 -0.1711 -0.0038 -0.0123
(-7.9314) (-0.2847) (-4.5862) (-1.7864) (-8.4704) (-4.0505)
Feb-Nov -0.0532 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0231 -0.0004 0.0058
(-29.2124) (-0.6562) (-4.2579) (-0.5866) (-3.0217) (7.5394)
Dec -0.0666 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.2267 0.0001 0.0102
(-10.9771) (-0.8759) (-1.2674) (1.9665) (0.2758) (4.2340)
Panel E: April 1982 to December 1996
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
All -0.0297 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0233 -0.0002 0.0035
(-20.3628) (0.1063) (-0.6985) (-1.2045) (-1.8569) (4.8216)
Jan -0.0401 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0540 -0.0013 -0.0110
(-8.9945) (0.2767) (-0.4923) (0.6699) (-3.6897) (-3.0077)
Feb-Nov -0.0284 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0350 -0.0001 0.0042
(-18.1436) (0.6909) (-0.4204) (-1.7047) (-0.8256) (5.7574)
Dec -0.0325 -0.0028 -0.0003 0.0177 0.0000 0.0106
(-5.1506) (-1.9620) (-0.5609) (0.2447) (0.0839) (4.6193)
32Table III
Alternative Explanations
This table investigates alternative explanations for the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on the capital gains
regressor. For Panels A and B, ¯ g is calculated from a reference price using ¯ V
j
t , ﬁrm j’s average weekly
turnover from weeks t − 52 to t − 1i nt h ef o r m u l af o rt h eg a i nv a r i a b l eu s e di nw e e kt’s cross-sectional
regression. Panel A replicates Panel C of Table II, replacing our original capital gains variable by ¯ g.I nP a n e l
B, the relative signiﬁcance of the two gain variables are compared by including both as regressors. Panels
C and D investigate whether signiﬁcance was generated by the capital gains variable being correlated with
some interaction between past returns and volume over several horizons. Panels C and D add three turnover
and past return interaction terms without and with our original capital gains variable, respectively. The
parameter estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are obtained from the time series of the corresponding
cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients. There are a total of 1539 weekly regressions.
Panel A
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6¯ g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
All -0.0419 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0160 -0.0003 0.0043
(-35.3749) (-0.9434) (-5.6612) (-0.8074) (-4.3955) (8.0694)
Jan -0.0511 -0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0553 -0.0030 -0.0097
(-10.8551) (-0.3277) (-4.0810) (-0.8509) (-9.4107) (-3.9209)
Feb-Nov -0.0403 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0266 -0.0002 0.0051
(-32.0373) (-0.3395) (-4.2724) (-1.2182) (-1.8236) (9.2848)
Dec -0.0488 -0.0019 -0.0005 0.1250 0.0003 0.0103
(-10.7502) (-1.7329) (-1.3532) (1.8159) (1.2605) (6.0802)
Panel B
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5s + a6g + a7¯ g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
All -0.0424 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0133 -0.0003 0.0028 0.0014
(-34.7482) (-1.0308) (-5.1146) (-0.6459) (-3.8746) (2.4381) (1.2590)
Jan -0.0524 -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0193 -0.0022 -0.0238 0.0154
(-10.9145) (-0.7809) (-4.2183) (-0.2889) (-7.7160) (-4.0727) (2.5766)
Feb-Nov -0.0405 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0260 -0.0001 0.0042 0.0007
(-31.3421) (-0.2966) (-3.6772) (-1.1447) (-1.8369) (3.6161) (0.5650)
Dec -0.0513 -0.0020 -0.0004 0.1160 0.0002 0.0152 -0.0048
(-10.7503) (-1.6643) (-0.9656) (1.5729) (0.9717) (4.5511) (-1.4017)
33Panel C
r = a0 + a1r−4:−1 + a2r−52:−5 + a3r−156:−53 + a4 ¯ V + a5 ¯ V ∗ r−4:−1 + a6 ¯ V ∗ r−52:−5 + a7¯ V ∗ r−156:−53 + a8s
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
All -0.0601 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0805 1.2308 0.0169 0.0178 -0.0004
(-39.0925) (2.7829) (-2.9421) (-3.1500) (13.2851) (0.8890) (1.8128) (-4.4309)
Jan -0.0863 -0.0115 -0.0086 -0.0261 1.6915 0.2757 0.1494 -0.0041
(-10.3072) (-4.7567) (-6.3218) (-0.3156) (4.8222) (2.8754) (3.0648) (-11.3921)
Feb-Nov -0.0569 0.0020 -0.0002 -0.1055 1.1440 0.0074 0.0132 -0.0001
(-36.9647) (4.3620) (-0.8066) (-3.7325) (11.3819) (0.3675) (1.2977) (-1.5696)
Dec -0.0647 0.0067 0.0023 0.1080 1.6171 -0.1455 -0.0672 0.0008
(-12.7619) (4.6382) (3.5868) (1.2784) (5.1047) (-3.2586) (-2.1602) (3.1884)
Panel D
r = a0+a1r−4:−1+a2r−52:−5+a3r−156:−53+a4 ¯ V +a5¯ V ∗r−4:−1+a6 ¯ V ∗r−52:−5+a7 ¯ V ∗r−156:−53+a8s+a9g
Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9
All -0.0505 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0448 0.8291 0.0172 0.0203 -0.0004 0.0041
(-36.9999) (-1.0135) (-5.2744) (-1.8042) (9.8004) (0.9803) (2.0141) (-5.4115) (7.7062)
Jan -0.0631 0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0606 1.2519 0.0256 -0.0324 -0.0026 -0.0127
(-10.9625) (0.2253) (-2.1356) (-0.7509) (4.2349) (0.3194) (-0.7282) (-8.6123) (-5.2671)
Feb-Nov -0.0481 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0668 0.7449 0.0230 0.0295 -0.0002 0.0052
(-33.5092) (-0.8019) (-4.7637) (-2.4386) (8.0398) (1.2122) (2.7375) (-3.0289) (9.5347)
Dec -0.0619 -0.0017 -0.0004 0.1836 1.2275 -0.0471 -0.0171 0.0001 0.0102
(-12.0063) (-1.3278) (-0.8323) (2.2080) (4.2620) (-1.0533) (-0.5460) (0.3912) (5.9292)
34Figure 1
Momentum for Diﬀerent Past Return Horizons
This ﬁgure plots the expected price change over next month in a simulated economy for momentum strategies
that sort stocks on past returns over diﬀerent horizons. First, 100,000 paths of fundamental values F
over 60 months are simulated according to a random walk model, assuming initial F = R =1 . T h e
reference price, the market price and agents’ equilibrium holdings are calculated along each path, assuming
Rt+1 = VtPt +( 1− Vt)Rt,w h e r eVt is turnover ratio. At month 60, a momentum porfolio is formed that
buys the top decile (winners) and shorts the lowest decile (losers) sorted according to the change in the
fundamental value over past n months, for n =1 ,2,...,36. The expected price change over the next month
of this winner minus loser portfolio is plotted against the past return horizon used to identify winners and
losers. The graph is generated with following model parameters: annual volatility of F is σ =3 0 % ;b constant
and consistent with type-r investors’ absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient of γ = 2 (a myopic exponential utility
function); µ =1 /3, implying that 1/3 of investors are subject to the disposition eﬀect and λ =1 .





















































Time Series of Cross-Sectional Percentiles of the Capital Gains Regressor
This ﬁgure plots the time series of the empirical 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the cross-sectional
distribution of the capital gains regressor. The sample period is from July 1967 to December 1996, for a
total of 1539 weeks. Each week, we include all stocks (with sharecode 10 or 11) listed on NYSE and AMEX
which have at least ﬁve years of historical tading data from mini-CRSP. The previous ﬁve years of return
and turnover data are used to calculate the capital gains variable as one less the ratio of the end of week
t − 1 reference price to the end of week t − 2 price, where the week t − 1 reference price is the average cost













with k a constant that makes the weights on past prices sum to one.




































Equilibrium and Demand Functions in a 3-Date Exponential
Utility Model
Within the context of the model described in Section I, we consider the date 0 valuation of
two securities: a risk-free asset with a return of 0 in inﬁnitiely elastic supply and a risky
stock that pays a liquidating dividend ˜ F2 at date 2. Trading at date 1 occurs after receiving
a normally distributed signal about F2 that resolves half of the uncertainty about the ﬁnal
payoﬀ.T h a ti s ,
E1[F2]=E 0[F2]+ 1,  1 ∼ N(0,σ
2)
and Var1(F2)=σ2. It follows that
Var0(F2)=E 0[Var1(F2)] + Var0(E1[F2]) = 2σ
2
There are two types of price-taking investors: type-r, whose demand function has weight
1 − µ, has CARA utility over terminal wealth without intermediate consumption. This
type chooses date 0 risky asset shareholding α0 and date 1 shareholding α1 in the stock to
maximize expected utility of ﬁnal wealth:
Maxα0,α1 E[−e
−γW2]
where γ is his absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient. Denote Dr
t(Pt)a st y p er’s optimal demand
at date t given price Pt,a n dd e ﬁne Ft as the price at which he would optimally hold one
share of the stock, assuming knowledge of how type-d investors inﬂuence future equilibrium









with variables and their dynamics deﬁned in the body of the paper.
We calculate the type-r investors optimal demand function (in shares) for the stock,
given the conjecture that the linear equilibrium price function
Pt = wFt +( 1− w)Rt,where w =
1
1+µλ
applies. By the argument in the body of the text, the market will clear at the above
conjectured price as long as type r’s date 0 demand Dr
0(P0)e x i s t s( a n di sﬁnite).
We now explicitly calculate Dr




is positive. At date 2, the risky asset’s value is F2 as there is only a liquidating payout.
Hence at date 1, the rational agent’s optimal demand at any price P1 will be the same as
37that in a fully rational economy. With CARA utility and a normally distributed date 2




θ +  1
γσ2
which generates a fully rational equilibrium price satisfying
F1 = θ +  1 − γσ
2 (27)
We obtain the date 1 indirect utility function J1(W1,P 1) by evaluating the expected utility








We now turn to the optimal demand at date 0. At any price P0 at date 0, the type-r






1 = wF1 +( 1− w)R1 is the equilibrium price at date 1, and
W1 = W0 + α0(P
∗
1 − P0)=W0 + α0(wF1 +( 1− w)R1 − P0)
































where m0,m 1 and m2 are deterministic functions of model parameters, price P0, reference
price R1 = νP0+(1−ν)R0 (which is known at date 0 given R0 and exogenous ν), and shares











38where h1 and h2 are functions of P0
h1 = w(θ − γσ
2)+( 1− w)R1 − P0
h2 =( 1 − w)(θ − R1)+wγσ
2
Denote y =  1 +
m1
2m2,t h e ny ∼ N(
m1
2m2,σ2). Note that the probability density function








. This is of the same functional form as
e−m2y2,a n dg r e a t l ys i m p l i ﬁes the computation of the expectation E[e−m2y2]. Note that the
expression to be maximized here involves only the expectation of an exponential of a normal
random variable  1 and its square.
We now make use of moment generating functions of normal and χ2 random variables
to derive the solution. By completing squares and using the fact that the integral of a










































Since m0 and m1 are linear in α0, the function being optimized above is quadratic in α0.
The coeﬃcient for the α2
0 term is negative, and hence a maximum exists. The ﬁrst order
condition implies that the optimal choice α∗
0 = α∗





0(P0)=h1(P0)+( 1− w)(1 − w − h2(P0)w)





γw2σ2(h1(P0)+( 1− w)(1 − w − h2(P0)w)( 3 0 )
By deﬁnition, F0 satisﬁes
γw
2σ
2 = h1(F0)+( 1− w)(1 − w − h2(F0)w)
or 1 =
1
γw2σ2(h1(F0)+( 1− w)(1 − w − h2(F0)w)( 3 1 )





γw2σ2 ((h1(P0) − h1(F0)) + (1 − w)w(h2(F0) − h2(P0))) (32)
Upon substituting h1,h 2,a n du s i n gR1 = νP0 +( 1− ν)R0,
h1(P0) − h1(F0)=( 1 − ν(1 − w))(F0 − P0)
h2(F0) − h2(P0)=( 1 − w)ν(P0 − F0)







(1 − (1 − w)ν) − (1 − w)
2wν
i










Also note that when P0 = F0, both sides of (33) are 0, since by deﬁnition, α∗
0(F0) − 1=0 .
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